The exact contours of international organisations" ( 
Both the source and the expression of these heightened expectations is the operational policies and procedures (OP&P) of IFIs, which are internal documents that contain prescriptions ("rules", "guidelines" and "procedures") -addressed to both IFI staff and external parties, such as borrowers -concerning the manner in which the operations of the organisation ought to be performed. Hence, the OP&P cover a wide range of functional areas, such as environmental and social safeguards, procedures to be followed when assessing, designing and implementing development projects, and technical details such as disbursing funds, preparing for missions etc. 5 OP&P could be -and increasingly are -compared to administrative rules and procedures found in domestic law, and as such is evolving into, what is called by some, "global administrative law" (Kingsbury et al. 2005; Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter 2010) .
Moreover, as this report illustrates, the normative significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P are being enhanced through regular internal policy revision processes and the evolving practice of "Independent Accountability
Mechanisms" (IAMs). IAMs, now present in some form at most IFIs, are internal bodies with varying (although significant) degrees of institutional independence that are tasked with investigating and/or resolving complaints from people who claim that they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the failure of the IFI to comply with its OP&P (Shihata 2000; Bradlow 2005; Van Putten 2008) . Some of them are also mandated to provide advice to the IFI on the further development of its OP&P. 6 In other words, the emphasis of the debate concerning the contours of the international legal obligations of IOs seems to have shifted over the past two decades or so from "getting them to comply" with international standards, such as human rights standards (especially those contained in the ICCPR) in the abstract, to getting
IOs to incorporate or "mainstream" international human rights and environmental standards into their operations. 7 In this sense, IOs -and the IFIs in particular -are truly becoming law-making bodies through the manner in which they draft, interpret and apply their OP&P (Alvarez 2006 ).
This report
The report focuses on the OP&P of a subset of IFIs, namely, the Multilateral The report will provide a general overview of the content of OP&Ps, their formulation, adoption, amendment ("rule-making procedures") and their enforcement.
It will highlight three developments that are arguably strengthening the normative significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P, namely: the broadening stakeholder participation in OP&P revision processes; the "hardening" or legalization of OP&P through IAM compliance procedures; and the emerging enforcement potential of the IAMs. The report will conclude with a few preliminary observations.
Overview of operational policies and procedures at multi-lateral development banks
This section provides an overview of the functional content covered by OP&P at the MDBs (2.1), followed by a brief description of the procedures by which OP&P are formulated, adopted and amended (2.2) as well as enforced (2.3). For a structured comparison between the MDBs, see Appendix 7.1 below.
Content
Over time, the OP&P at MDBs have come to cover all functional areas flowing from the main objectives of these institutions, which can be summarized as the provision of lending products and related expertise -in line with the MDBs" development strategies -that support both development projects and programmes in their member states. 15 Consequently, the OP&P of MDBs typically govern the appraisal, design and implementation of development projects and programmes; as well as the anticipation, prevention and mitigation of various potential adverse effects that may flow from these activities.
Classifying OP&P
MDBs employ combinations of different categorizations for their OP&P, such as sector-specific (e.g., forestry and mining) vs. cross-sectoral policies (e.g., anticorruption and procurement policies) and country/region-specific policies (e.g.,
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regional and sub-regional cooperation). The most common classifications, however, are functional in nature. 16 For example:
(1) "safeguard" policies that aim to manage various social and environmental risks inherent in development projects, and to ensure sustainable development (e.g., policies on environmental impact assessments, indigenous people, involuntary resettlement);
(2) public information disclosure policies, clarifying which project-related information must be made available to different stakeholders (e.g., project affected people (PAP) or civil society), and at what stage of the project cycle;
(3) management and project supervision policies, which set out MDB obligations (often vis-à-vis the borrower) in the appraisal, design, and implementation of development projects;
(4) policies detailing the procedures concerning the MDB"s independent accountability mechanism (IAM), as well as other internal and external accountability and development effectiveness measures (e.g., procurement policies, and policies ensuring institutional integrity, detecting fraud and corruption);
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(5) policies aiding staff in the development and application of its lending products (e.g., lending eligibility and terms);
(6) policies aimed at higher strategic levels in the MDB, such as regional, country and sector-specific strategy policies that aim to assist the MDB in its formulation of development strategies (e.g., country assistance management, poverty reduction).
Another useful classification increasingly being employed by MDBs concerns the differentiation between borrower and. MDB obligations. 18 The blurred lines of 16 Another classification might relate to the substantive vs. procedural elements in policies. While most OP&P contain both substantive and procedural elements, some focus more on procedural issues (e.g., policies setting standards concerning stakeholder consultation and public disclosure of project-related information However, this formal position is being changed by evolving practice. While official adoption and amendment procedures remain intact, informal rule-making processes that involve extensive stakeholder participation are becoming more common, as the next section will illustrate.
Evolving OP&P review processes
The lack of (effective) 
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Notwithstanding the mixed success of stakeholder participation in past OP&P reviews, a few noticeable trends can be discerned from more recent developments.
The most evident observation is that most of the OP&P revision processes currently underway or recently completed involved invitations for public participation as part of the review process. For instance, public participation was involved in the WB"s recently concluded major revision of In general these OP&P reviews seem to be the result of the institutions" genuine need for their OP&P to reflect evolving practice and the realization that the content of the OP&P has to be updated and refined in the light of the lessons in MDB operations. The relevance of public participation in this process is reflected in this To conclude, while public participation in these rule-making processes has still not been formalized or "codified" in a "policy about policies", 45 current OP&P reviews seem to have embedded stakeholder consultation in MDB practice.
Enforcement mechanisms
All MDBs have established fairly extensive institutional frameworks to ensure consistent enforcement of the OP&P throughout their institutions and across all their borrowers. For instance, a variety of internal bodies have been put in place to ensure institutional compliance, such as departments charged with ensuring more systemic compliance 46 (e.g., evaluations departments that take a retroactive view and quality assurance departments that take a proactive view on compliance performance of individual projects) and others mandated specifically to investigate specific instances of alleged non-compliance (e.g., institutional integrity units and IAMs through their compliance functions, although non-compliance might also come to light in the course of their problem solving stages). 47 As far as the institutional mandate of the IAMs is concerned, it is important to note that it is usually limited to "upper level" OP&P (or certain subsets within it, such as safeguard policies). 48 Hence, it is controversial when an MDB "deregulates" certain aspects of a policy to the "lower level" OP&P as it effectively narrows the IAM"s enforcement mandate. & Hunter 2010, at 232-237. 46 Interestingly, the WB is currently conducting a review of all five of its internal independent evaluation and review mechanisms.
47 IAMs, with the exception of the WB"s IP, typically fulfil two functions: dispute-resolution in a "problem-solving phase" and compliance assurance in a "compliance phase" -see Bradlow & Naudé Fourie, in Hale & Hand (eds.) forthcoming.
A point of criticism made in this context has been the lack of internal sanctions used against Bank staff in cases of proven non-compliance, especially in cases of findings more systemic non-compliance. 50 While this is a valid concern as it points to the question of the effective functioning of IAMs and to MDB staff and management"s perception of the IAMs, this criticism must be viewed in context.
Although it is certainly possible that there are cases of "repeat offenders" among staff, it is more likely that the major problems concerning OP&P compliance arise from the complexity of the projects being funded by the MDBs, staff uncertainty about how to apply the policies (which, in turn, is sometimes caused by mixed messages from management), 51 gaps in the available knowledge, or staff succumbing to time and cost pressures.
Borrower compliance with OP&P, on the other hand, is generally ensured by Interestingly, all MDBs specifically mention their public information disclosure policies as a crucial element of their compliance framework -the logic being that increased transparency (and the increased public scrutiny following from this) leads to better conditions for ensuring institutional compliance with OP&P. The trend certainly has been to disclose more information over the years. In fact, the WB"s recently amended "Access to Information Policy" adopted an even broader approach: 
"Hardening" the OP&P through IAM compliance procedures
The potential of the OP&P to evolve into more than mere norms that promote better standards in MDB operations has long been recognised (Kingsbury 1999) , which means that they can be used to hold MDBs responsible for their actions and even contribute to the normative development of international law in particular areas. This conclusion followed from the fact that the IAMs, in exercising their compliance review mandates, 55 logically had to interpret the OP&P in order to determine whether or not the MDBs have been in compliance with the provisions in question. 53 See above, note 31.
54 See section 4 below.
Prior to the establishment of the IAMs, this interpretative function was the exclusive responsibility of the MDB management and staff, including the Banks" legal departments, which would be asked to interpret the policies whenever a particular issue implicated the Bank"s legal obligations. 56 The establishment of the IAMs created the potential for the IAMs and the Management and staff to follow different interpretations of the OP&Ps, which are drafted in relatively broad language and often without great detail or precision on how they should be applied. These differences in interpretation compel the institutional entity responsible for final approval of the IAM"s compliance review reports (usually, the Bank"s Board of Executive Directors) to decide which OP&P interpretation to accept. This is a new function for the MDB"s Boards of Directors and has created a challenge for them because they often feel ill-equipped to choose between the different interpretations.
However, as we will illustrate below, it can be argued that the IAMs" It might be argued that the IAMs have had an insufficient number of compliance reviews ("jurisprudence") to answer these questions conclusively. This is particular applicable to the IAMs at the regional development banks, most of which have recently undergone institutional review and reform (as section 3.2 will elaborate). The World Bank"s Inspection Panel (WBIP), on the other hand, which has been active since 1994 and has not undergone an institutional review since 1999, has accumulated a fair number of compliance review cases. 58 The Panel has furthermore been the subject of a fair amount of research. The remainder of this section will therefore use the WBIP as basis for the analysis.
Illustrative: The World Bank's Inspection Panel
Strengthening the obligatory nature of OP&P It appears that substantial confusion exists among WB Bank staff, management and
Board members about the nature of OP&Ps: are they "strict marching orders" to be closely followed by Bank staff and borrowers, 59 or do they allow for considerable leeway, or "managerial discretion"? 60 This uncertainty was clearly demonstrated in the IP"s landmark China Qinghai case (1999) (2000) . The Panel acknowledged that the OP&P (most still styled as "directives" at that point) did allow for some managerial discretion, but insisted that the directives cannot possibly be taken to authorize a level of "interpretation" and "flexibility" that would permit those who must follow these directives to simply override the portions of the directives that are clearly binding. ; IDB (7 compliance review cases in total); AfDB (6 requests for both compliance reviews and problem solving); and EBRD (4 requests since new mechanism was adopted in 2010). The possible exception would the IFC"s CAO, which, as of March 2011, has registered over 50 cases (with 11 cases going to compliance review) since its inception. concept. In essence, the Panel argues that a mere "process" or formalistic approach to compliance is typically not enough to ensure that a project is compliant with an OP&P. For example, an environmental assessment that meets all the formal criteria set out in the OP&P could still be inadequate when the substantive quality is taken into account. As the Panel concluded in the China Qinghai case:
[…] in appraising compliance, Management had an obligation to satisfy itself not only that the process and procedures mandated by the policies had been followed, but also that the work under review met professionally acceptable standards of quality. In other words, both process and quality were essential components of compliance. findings. 80 Or consider Management"s proposals to engage in discussion with the IP on what "compliance" might mean in certain circumstances:
[i]n conducting EAs, the question of how much data is enough frequently arises, given the need to make case-by-case judgments on the type and amount of data to be collected […] . 
Enhancing enforcement potential through institutional reforms of IAMs
A consistent criticism of the WBIP process has been the lack of formalized Panel and
Requester involvement in the development and implementation of Management remedial action plans (i.e., strengthening of the "enforcement" elements of the process). 82 It is one matter to find, often pervasive, occurrences of non-compliance with OP&P; it is another matter altogether to ensure that those specific instances are 80 Compare e.g., the MR in 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project and Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (see MR to IR, Annex 1 -where Management "noted" the Panel"s findings of non-compliance in many instances, but concluded that there was "no action to be taken" or that the Bank would "continue supervision" -see e.g., action numbers 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 31) ii) The MDBs have been making significant progress in facilitating broad stakeholder participation in their OP&P review processes; however, such participation remains at the discretion of the MDB, and has not been formalized (or, "codified"), for example, through the adoption of a "policy about policies". 92 We suggest that this should be a logical next step now that the practice of stakeholder participation in OP&P reviews have become more firmly embedded in the institutional culture.
iii) The ongoing normative development of OP&P is fuelled by public participation in review processes and by the ability of non-state actors to 92 To some extent, some policies establishing the IAMs would seem to be an exception -see e.g., para. v) The evolution of OP&P at the MDBs, and the role played by the IAMs in this regard, potentially hold broader implications for ensuring IO responsibility, and for international law as a whole. For instance:
 Given the significance of MDBS in the international arena (the WB and IFC in particular), current OP&P review processes may be developing rules for public participation at the international level -"administrative" rules which appear to be lacking or, at least underdeveloped in conventional international law discourse.
 The normative development of the substantive and procedural aspects of legal concepts and constructs such as "consultation" and "compliance" through 
